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THE UNBEARABLE UNIMPORTANCE OF THE
CATHOLIC MOMENT IN SUPREME
COURT HISTORYt
MATTHEW J. FRANCK*
Our topic is a cornucopia that is overflowing with somewhat
disparate considerations. In general, what "commitments" do we
expect nominees to the federal bench, especially to the Supreme
Court, to bring with them to judicial service? What difference, if
any, should it make what a nominee's religious commitments
happen to be? What can properly be a subject of inquiry with
respect to those commitments-religious or otherwise-by either
Presidents or Senators? What assurances on such matters, if any,
can the nominees properly make in response to such inquiries?
Back behind these questions is another one that deserves
some preliminary exploration: Why are we talking about this
now, in the year of Our Lord 2005? Yes, it has been much
remarked that should Judge Samuel Alito, now the President's
nominee to fill the seat to be vacated by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, be confirmed as an Associate Justice, the U.S.
Supreme Court will have a majority of Justices-five of nine-
who are Catholics. Judge Alito would be the eleventh Catholic
member in the entire history of the Supreme Court, and the
110th Justice of the Court, making Catholics an exact ten percent
of the Court's historic membership.' That five of those eleven
Catholics should be serving together, at the same moment in his-
t On November 9, 2005, the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy hosted a symposium entitled The Religious Commitments of Judicial
Nominees. Professor Franck was the second speaker at the Symposium. His
remarks have been revised for publication. See also D'Army Bailey, The Relig-
ious Commitments of Judicial Nominees-Address by Judge Bailey (Nov. 9,
2005), in 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 443 (2006); FrancisJ. Beck-
with, Taking Theology Seriously: The Status of The Religious Beliefs ofJudicial
Nominees for the Federal Bench (Nov. 9, 2005), in 20 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'y 455 (2006).
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1. See HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY
OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 46
(new and rev. ed. 1999).
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tory, is nearly as remarkable as that they should together make
up a majority of the current Court.
It is a good sign of the waning of anti-Catholic prejudice in
America that a Protestant President should appoint John Roberts
and Samuel Alito, two Catholics, to replace two Protestants, and
that there should be nothing terribly surprising or alarming
about that fact in the view of most Protestant Americans. In fact,
while the religious views of political candidates have sometimes
been a matter of great interest and controversy-think of
Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln dealing with their repu-
tations as men untethered to any church, or of Al Smith and
John F. Kennedy facing open worries that they were too tightly
tethered to Rome-the religious faith of Supreme Court Justices
has really never been all that important.
The Court's first Catholic, Roger B. Taney, was the victim of
a Senate stalling tactic on the occasion of his first nomination as
an Associate Justice by Andrew Jackson. The President had his
revenge on his political enemies by re-nominating Taney as Chief
Justice and seeing it through some months later. This opposition
to Taney had nothing to do with religion and everything to do
with his actions as Treasury Secretary in the political furor over
the National Bank.2 When Edward D. White, the second Catho-
lic on the Court, was appointed in 1894, the nominee was already
the majority leader of the Senate, which unanimously confirmed
him to the Court on the same day his nomination arrived from
the White House.3 White would laterjoin the very exclusive club
of persons confirmed to the Court twice, when in 1910 he
became the first Associate Justice ever elevated to Chief Justice.4
One can hardly see any sign in either of these cases that the
"religious commitments" of judicial nominees mattered at all.
From White's day to the present, with the exception of a seven-
year gap before the arrival of Justice William Brennan in 1956,
there has always been at least one Catholic on the Court.5
The other religious minority in this majority-Protestant
country that has been represented on the Court in the last cen-
tury is American Jewry. The first Jewish Justice was Louis Bran-
deis, and his appointment in 1916 occasioned much controversy.
It prompted the first public hearings by a Senate committee on
the subject of a Supreme Court nomination (though Brandeis
2. See id. at 74.
3. Id. at 109.
4. Id. at 108-09, 128.
5. JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES
125 (1995).
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himself was not a witness at those hearings), and "the delay of
more than four months" between nomination and confirmation
"is still a record."6 Brandeis, a non-observant Jew, yet an active
Zionist political leader, was openly opposed not because of his
religious heritage but because of his allegedly "radical" politics.
Very little did anti-Semitism come out into the open in the
debate over his nomination, and historians disagree over how
much importance to attach to it even in the background.7
As Edward White had earlier become the first holder of a
"Catholic seat," Brandeis inaugurated the tradition of a 'Jewish
seat," though here, too, there was one significant interval, an
even longer one (1969-1993), when no one occupied the seat.8
When Benjamin Cardozo joined Brandeis on the Court in 1932,
no one appears to have objected to the notion of two Jews on the
Court simultaneously-with the exception of the virulently anti-
Semitic Justice James McReynolds, who could not bring himself
to speak to either of his Jewish colleagues 9 (and that was the least
of his offenses). Indeed, Herbert Hoover found himself
badgered relentlessly into nominating Cardozo, a Democrat, by
Senators of both parties, and the Senate approved the appoint-
ment "instantly and unanimously-in ten seconds-without
debate or roll call" when it reached the floor.'"
The parallel traditions of appointing "token" Catholics and
Jews to the Supreme Court went their merry and separate ways
for many years, with nary a question about what these Justices'
"religious commitments" might mean when it came to interpret-
ing the Constitution and other laws. The appointments were
pure interest-group politics and nothing more. Nobody seems to
have asked Joseph McKenna, Pierce Butler, or Frank Murphy
what his Catholicism might ever have to do with his decision-
making, and the episode in William Brennan's hearings, of
which Professor Gerard Bradley has reminded us, was but a pass-
ing moment. Not even Antonin Scalia or Anthony Kennedy
faced such questions in more recent years, and as for Clarence
Thomas, a Catholic now, he was safely Episcopalian when he was
roasted slowly over the Senate's coals for other reasons alto-
gether. No one seems to have cared about the Judaism of Felix
Frankfurter, Arthur Goldberg, or Abe Fortas-or more recently
6. ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 135.
7. Cf id. at 136; see also Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis, in THE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1995, at 331, 334 (Clare
Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995).
8. See MALTESE, supra note 5, at 125.
9. See ABRAHAM, supra note 1, at 133-34.
10. Id. at 154.
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about that of Ruth Bader Ginsburg or Stephen Breyer-as it
might be brought to bear on constitutional law.
So what has changed to bring questions about the "religious
commitments" of the Catholic Chief Justice John Roberts and
Judge Samuel Alito to the forefront of our attention-or for that
matter, the faith of the nondenominational evangelical Harriet
Miers during the course of her unhappy October?
Three things have changed, which we can take in ascending
order of importance. The first is numbers. Two Jews out of nine
Justices-okay, that's mildly interesting. Two or even three
Catholics out of nine Justices-likewise of passing interest. But
four or five Catholics? A critical mass, the biggest religious "bloc"
on the Court, or even a majority? That is an occasion for asking,
"Gee, how did that happen?" This becomes still more interesting
if it is thought that the Justices might ever think of themselves as
banding together in a case for shared religious reasons (a doubt-
ful proposition, but bear with me).
The second thing that has changed is that nominees now
routinely appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee to testify
and to answer questions as part of the process of Senate advice
and consent. Yet in a strange dance of indirection, the Senators
and the nominees manage to avoid discussing the most impor-
tant thing that could possibly be discussed at such hearings: what
the nominee actually thinks the Constitution means. Senators of
the President's party, or most of them, anyway, declare that
sound principles call for deference to the President's choice, as
though an electoral mandate creates a nearly irrebuttable pre-
sumption of trust in the President (this may have been the pre-
sumption in which President Bush placed his own trust on
October 3, 2005)." The nominee's myrmidons also argue, as a
corollary to this deference principle, that examination of the
nominee should be limited to the most arid considerations of his
or her "qualifications"-i.e., knowledge of and experience in the
law, particularly constitutional law; ethics and personal integrity;
and judicial "temperament," however that is understood. No
trace of a principle favoring such deference, or such a limited
inquiry, can be located in the Constitution or in history, but it is
an obviously useful political argument to make.
On the other side, Senators predisposed to oppose the nom-
inee circle warily; they look for vulnerabilities and probe for
them with questions designed to elicit the telling hint or the
unguarded declaration of a plain opinion about legal principles.
11. President George W. Bush nominated Harriet Miers to the Supreme
Court on October 3, 2005.
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The nominee, meanwhile, tries to fend off these jabs with vague
pleas about the need to maintain 'judicial independence" (as if
that were some kind of solution rather than a problem), should
the questions that a Senator asks actually come before the Court,
or return to it in the form of opportunities to reconsider past
rulings and their vitality as precedents. With the help of the
aforementioned myrmidons and assorted others making unper-
suasive arguments about the requirements of various judicial eth-
ics standards, the nominee almost always exits the committee
room leaving behind as much mystery about his or her views as
was present when the hearings began.
This has been the pattern at least since the hearings on Rob-
ert Bork's nomination in 1987, and even before, if we recall that
in 1986 Antonin Scalia refused even to affirm his conviction that
Marbury v. Madison was sound precedent12 (we still do not know
the answer to that, come to think of it). Bork's candor-a prod-
uct of his paper trail and his pride-cost him all in the vote of a
Senate with a Democratic majority. Every nominee since then
has behaved more like Scalia. It is a strange result of this pattern
of nomination politics that anyone should now think of inquiring
into a nominee's "religious commitments," while that never mat-
tered in the past when the United States was a less tolerant and
inclusive country where religion was concerned. There were a
few such inquiries, delicately ventured and gently rebuffed, in
the hearings for Chief Justice John Roberts.13 I doubt very much
that we will cross the line any time soon to actually hearing
deeply probing questions in the hearings on matters of faith and
belief, but "out of doors," as the framers would have said, this is
where we are. Since the hearings prove so uninformative about
the only questions that can justify holding them at all-nomi-
nees' views on plainly stated questions of constitutional meaning
and Supreme Court decisions of the past-we who stand outside
that process find ourselves turning to information that will serve
as a proxy for what is denied to us; hence the interest of the press
and the public in the religious faith of judicial nominees. The
Bush White House even tried, with terrible clumsiness, to make
broad hints about the conservative evangelical faith of Harriet
Miers do double duty-to inform its usual supporters obliquely
of her views on constitutional law and to divert them from the
question of her qualifications for a seat on the Court.
12. See MALTESE, supra note 5, at 110.
13. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 109th Cong. 227-28 (2005) (colloquy with Sen. Diane Feinstein).
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I have not yet uttered the "A" word: "abortion." This brings
me to the third thing that has changed since the days of Taney
and White, Brandeis and Cardozo. It is the thing that alone
makes the prospect of five Catholics on the high bench more
than interesting; the thing that draws our eyes and ears to our
television sets even to listen to one more interminable speech
masquerading as a question from Senator Joseph Biden. It is
that the Court today, like at no time in its history, with the possi-
ble exceptions of 1857 and 1937, is at the center of a great politi-
cal war between contending forces intent on capturing and
controlling the authoritative understanding of the Constitution.
We could use an overused phrase and call it a "culture war," or
we could say that we live in a time of great moral upheaval: an
upheaval into which the Court has thrust itself for the last three
to five decades, and in which it has played a significant role as an
agent, and sometimes the instigator, of change. Ripples and
eddies of this upheaval play themselves out in cases involving the
rights of homosexuals, the right to die, and cases under the relig-
ion clause of the First Amendment. But at the center of the
upheaval stands Roe v. Wade,14 and the buttresses and stanchions
propping up the unfettered abortion license in such subsequent
rulings as Planned Parenthood v. Casey15 and Stenberg v. Carhart.16
I need not expatiate on the obvious distortions that Roe has
caused in our law and politics in the last thirty-two years. But
now it bids fair to achieve one more ill effect: the violation of the
spirit, though not the letter, of the "no religious test" clause of
Article VI of the Constitution. 17 Hampered by the uneasy truce
that largely bars the asking and answering of direct questions
about Roe and similar matters, we are tempted to turn instead to
hints and tea leaves about how a prospective Justice of the Court
might rule in future cases brought to it by the moral maelstrom it
has itself helped to unleash.
So, too, we reach the final, absurd ugliness: discussing what
kind of Catholic or Christian a nominee might be, for (to stick
with the present nominee for now) we know that there are
Catholics and then there are Catholics. How frequent the church-
going? To what sort of parish? What sort of information can we
pry out of the nominee's pastor? Or his elderly mother? Are
there hints to be gleaned from how many children he has? Or
where he sends them to school? Does the nominee or his wife
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
16. 530 U.S. 913 (2000).
17. See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as
a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.").
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teach Sunday School? What views on theological questions,
church doctrine, or the authority of the Magisterium has the
nominee ever been heard or seen to express? Has he been heard
to compliment his pastor on a pro-life homily? Does he take the
host in the mouth or in the hand?
Should it not go without saying that such questions as these
are wholly inappropriate, and that if any Senator had the temer-
ity to ask them face-to-face, a nominee would be more than enti-
tled to respond, "None of your business. Ask me something
else?"
If it is crossing the line for a Senator to ask a nominee such
questions, what is it for the rest of us to muse about them "out of
doors"? Little better, I should think. This is the consequence of
the Supreme Court's self-politicization and its assumption of a
central role in our ongoing moral fracas. The Court's self-
politicization now threatens to politicize the religious faith of
judicial nominees and thus to exacerbate the political conflict
between people of differing faiths and even within certain
churches themselves.
The only way out of this unseemly dilemma is to use the
occasion of judicial nominations to ask nominees about what is
the public's business-the constitutional opinions they will bring
to the bench. To paraphrase Woodrow Wilson, we need open
commitments, openly arrived at, but they must be constitutional
commitments rather than religious ones. Only that way lies a
political settlement of our moral upheavals with which the con-
tending forces in American society can peaceably live.
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